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Abstract Sosa takes epistemic normativity to be kind of performance normativity:
a belief is correct because a believer sets a positive value to truth as an aim and
performs aptly and adroitly. I object to this teleological picture that beliefs are not
performances, and that epistemic reasons or beliefs cannot be balanced against
practical reasons. Although the picture fits the nature of inquiry, it does not fit the
normative nature of believing, which has to be conceived along distinct lines.
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In his beautifully crafted book (Sosa 2011, henceforth KFW), Ernest Sosa takes
epistemic normativity to be a special case of performance normativity, and invites
us to understand belief as a kind of performance which has to pass three dimensions
of evaluation to become knowledge: when it reaches its aim (when it is true, or
accurate), when it is competent (or adroit) and when it is accurate because of this
competence (when it is apt). When knowledge becomes reflective we know ‘‘full
well’’. On his view, the correctness of belief is explained as the instantiation of a
teleological structure, and epistemic normativity is characterized in axiological
terms. Belief is aimed at truth, but this aim is not intrinsic: it could be directed
towards other goals. It is the specific kind of endeavor that an agent undertakes
which makes it a belief and which puts it on the right track on its way to knowledge.
I disagree with Sosa both about the nature of belief and about the normativity which
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is involved in it. If belief were a performance directed towards an aim, this aim
would not be exclusive and we would be able to weigh our epistemic reasons against
our practical reasons for believing. Although I can only suggest this view here, I
hold that the normativity of belief is not teleological but deontic: belief is governed
by a norm of truth.
Sosa’s account of epistemic normativity is governed by three main ideas. The
first is that the normativity that is attached to belief is dependent upon the kind of
normativity that is attached to knowledge: beliefs do not have any epistemic
normative status independently from their capacity to lead to knowledge. The
second is that the fundamental normative concepts are value concepts such as being
valuable or good, not concepts of a deontic kind such as ought, may or must. The
third is that belief is a kind of performance, directed at a certain aim. Hence what is
evaluated is the performance of an agent who, by aiming at truth, forms beliefs more
or less aptly and adroitly, or fails to do so. Hence epistemic normativity, both for
belief and for knowledge, is a kind of performance normativity. As the metaphor of
the archer who shoots with his arrows at the target indicates, the whole picture is
teleological, both in the sense that belief has literally an aim or a goal, and in the
sense in which the agent has in some sense an intention to reach that aim (the word
intentio in Latin means trying to reach).
On this picture, an epistemic performance is valuable in so far as it achieves its
goal and manifests the competence of the believer, hence in so far as it reaches the
knowledge level. Thus the value of knowledge is greater than the value of true
belief. But what kind of value is proper to true belief? Clearly it is the value which is
attached to a performance being accurate: a shot which does not hit its target cannot
be a good shot at all, even though it can manifest competence and skill in other
respects. There is value in performing well, but there is more value in being
successful while performing well. Nevertheless truth cannot be valuable in itself, for
otherwise trivial or idle truths would matter. So the aim of truth has normally to be
formulated as believing only truths, and not all truths. To search for truth for truth’s
sake does not make any sense, as Sosa (2001, 2003) has long argued: the value of
truth cannot be transcendent, but has to be relative to a specific domain of inquiry.
So the value, hence the normativity of belief must reside mainly in the believing
itself, hence in the performance, and not simply in the object or goal of the
performance, which is the truth of its content. Sosa’s account of the normativity of
belief, however, encounters several difficulties.
The first concerns the nature of belief. A performance account of belief, although
it helps us differentiate knowledge from belief, tends to blur the difference between
belief and other doxastic attitudes. Some attitudes such as believing, judging,
conjecturing, guessing, suspecting, doubting, etc. are non-factive. Others such as
knowing, perceiving, seeing, hearing, realizing, etc. are factive. Factive attitudes
have contents which cannot fail to be true. Non-factive attitudes, by contrast can fail
to be true. Why is this? It seems that it has to do with the fact that when one
believes, conjectures, guesses that P, one tries to reach the aim which is true, and
one can do it more or less well, whereas when one knows, one has reached the aim.
This lends support to Sosa’s view that believing is a kind of performance, but
we then lose what is specific to belief among the other attitudes. Sosa could answer
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that it is not an objection, but grist to his own mill, since not only judgments,
conjectures and guesses seem to be aimed at truth, are species of belief, hence of
performances.
But although guessing or judging can plausibly be classified among perfor-
mances, is belief a kind of performance? Does belief fall into one of the categories
that are distinguished by Aristotle’s famous division of verbs into movements
(kineseis) and accomplishments (energeiai), refined by Kenny (1963) and Vendler
(1967) into activities (running, pushing), accomplishments (run a mile, paint a
picture), achievements (recognize, find, fatten), or states (desire, want, love). A
performance belongs clearly to the class of accomplishments, which have a
beginning and an end in which they result. Beliefs, however, do not have clear
beginnings or endings: it does not make sense to say that one starts believing that
p at one point and that one has reached belief at another point, although this may be
true of belief formations or acquisitions. On many accounts, beliefs are states,
which endure and persist, and not performances or activities. They differ, in that
respect, from judgments, guesses or conjectures, which, at least in some senses, can
fall under the category of activities. There is a sense in which one can aim at
producing a true judgment about p, make up one’s mind as to whether p, and
proceed to assent to p through some kind of act of the will. Similarly there is a sense
in which someone who guesses whether p aims, intentionally, at having a true guess.
Sosa talks of epistemic agency. The usual criteria of agency are the presence of
reasons (an agent A u s if he has a reason to u), which involve at least intentions (he
agent intends to u) which cause the action (the agent u s because he has that
reason), the exercise of a certain degree of freedom, the presence of trying (the
agent can try to u), and, according to some accounts, a distinctive phenomenology
(there is a feeling of action) and a sense of authorship of one’s acts (O’Brien 2007).
All of three criteria apply perfectly to an archer bowing his arrow and aiming a
hitting a target with his arrow, and they apply to some mental actions such as
guessing and judging. But do these criteria apply to beliefs? Beliefs indeed can and
do have reasons, but these are epistemic reasons, not practical reasons. Clearly
beliefs in the sense of attitudes with a specific content, cannot be the object of
intentions, unless one subscribes to a form of doxastic voluntarism. As just noted,
one cannot try to believe in the sense in which one can try to judge or to guess.
Although some argue to the contrary (Bayne and Montague 2011), it is not clear that
beliefs have a distinctive phenomenology or are associated with a sense of agency.
Most of these criteria, however, apply without difficulty to beliefs as commitments
or as acts of acceptance that one takes in the course of inquiry. So is Sosa talking
about inquiry rather than about knowledge when he talks about belief and
knowledge? Attitudes such as committing oneself to p, accepting that p or taking
p for granted or as a working hypothesis are typically reflective; so when Sosa takes
belief to be a kind of performance is he not really talking about reflective or meta-
level, and not about first-order knowledge? He cannot be suspected to mix up the
two levels, since he is very clear about their distinction and about the fact that the
notion of performance applies not only to reflective level knowledge but also to
first-order belief and knowledge. He is equally clear about the fact that withholding
belief, although it would seem prima facie to be a non-performance, can actually be
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counted as a second-order performance, given that in these cases the epistemic agent
has a further, second-order aim: avoiding failure (KFW, pp. 4–7). Sosa (2007, p. 89)
also makes the distinction between knowledge and inquiry (KFW, p. 30) and
between the values which pertain to knowledge and belief on the one hand and those
which pertain to intellectual ethics on the other. So we must not confuse first-order
performance normativity—with second-order performance normativity. But it
remains that Sosa’s account of belief performance as performances fits better the
second-order mode of believing.
If I interpret Sosa correctly, the claim that beliefs are kinds of performances has
to be taken seriously for first-level belief and knowledge, i.e. at the animal
knowledge level, and not only at reflective or second-order level. But in what does it
consist? Sosa admits that there is a purely functional sense of performance, which
can apply to machines, devices, biological organs, although it does not apply to the
human level (KFW, pp. 3–4). Presumably there can be aiming at truth in his purely
functional sense: for instance the function of a biological cognitive organ, such as an
eye, or of an artificial device, such as an electronic eye, can be to aim at true
information or ‘‘beliefs’’. The cognitive system of a human can aim at truth
subintentionally (Velleman 2000, p. 253). So ‘‘animal’’ performance in belief and
knowledge must be situated between this low-level functioning and the reflective
level. Sosa comes closer to characterising this intermediate level when he tells us
that the exercise of epistemic agency can be rational, in the sense of belief being
held for motivating reasons, without involving a conscious deliberation or any act of
the will: ‘‘One can form beliefs rationally even if not deliberately, not voluntarily,
nor even consciously’’(KFW, p. 19). But to what extent can such beliefs manifest
epistemic agency and how can they be performances while not being intentionally
aimed at truth? In reply to an imaginary opponent, Sosa admits that a number of our
beliefs can be formed of sustained without any concern for truth or for epistemic
reasons, such as bad faith beliefs or self-deceptive ones. Are such beliefs
performances aimed at truth? By definition no, since they do not involve any
endeavor or pursuit towards truth, even though they can be motivated or caused by a
desire for truth (after all the cuckolded husband desires to know the truth about his
wife; KFW, pp. 20–21). Sosa’s account of beliefs as performances is thus
confronted to what Shah (2003) calls the ‘‘teleologist’s dilemma’’ which he ascribes
to any theorist who holds that the normativity of belief is due to the descriptive
relation between truth and belief (that of a goal which the believer aims at reaching).
On the one hand, the teleologist must allow the disposition that constitutes aiming at
truth to be so weak as to allow cases in which beliefs are caused by such non-
evidential processes as wishful thinking; on the other hand the teleologist must
strengthen the disposition to aim at truth so that it excludes the influence of non
truth-directed considerations. The problem is that there is no common description
of beliefs as performances directed towards truth which can apply to both the weak
and the strong disposition if belief is thus described in intentional or teleological
terms.
A second main difficulty concerns the structure of reasons for belief. If belief is
the more or less apt performance of a believer who aims at truth as a goal, then this
goal must be such that it can be weighed or balanced against other goals. But
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typically—as a matter of experience, when we deliberate consciously about what to
believe—beliefs our reasons for believing are epistemic or evidential reasons, not
practical reasons. There is here a clear difference between belief and other attitudes,
such as guessing, for when one guesses it may be perfectly rational to disregard
evidence and guess quickly in order to win a quiz game for instance (Owens 2003).
This absence of weighing seems to be more than a phenomenological fact of
doxastic deliberation. It seems that our reasons have to be to be intrinsically or
necessarily of the epistemic kind. Epistemic reasons or belief are ‘‘exclusive’’
(Steglich-Petersen 2009). Practical reasons for belief are not ‘‘the right kind of
reason’’ (Hieronymi 2005). Certainly this is not true in the descriptive or causal
sense, for the cases were our beliefs are caused by practical concerns are legion
(KFW, pp. 28–34). It has to be true in the sense of conceptual necessity, or of
normative necessity, if the performance account is supposed to express the
conditions under which a belief is correct. But the teleological analysis has to deny
this: it says that it is not in virtue of a normative fact or in virtue of some conceptual
necessity that a believer aims at truth, but in virtue of the descriptive psychological
fact—an intention—that he has elected truth has an aim, and in virtue of the fact that
truth is thereby to count as the main value in this circumstance or domain. The
teleologist about epistemic normativity has to deny that one cannot rationally opt for
another aim than an epistemic one in believing. He has to deny that one cannot, in
the sense of having a rational motivation or in the conceptual sense, weigh distinct
aims for believing. And Sosa actually does reject this. To his imaginary opponent
who objects that epistemic and practical reasons are dimensions which are ‘‘as
independent as are an ellipse’s eccentricity and the area that it bounds’’, Sosa replies
that ‘‘that cannot be right’’ since ‘‘after all people are admired for their disinterested
search for truth, despite strong temptations and social pressures that might bear on
their inquiry’’ (KFW, p. 30).
Now this claim is certainly true of inquiry, since inquiry is the process whereby
one sets oneself an aim—truth or knowledge—and takes various decisions about
how to reach this aim. In the course of deliberating about whether to believe
something, one can, as Sosa rightly insists, suspend judgment, in order to avoid
failure when evidence is insufficient. Or can also decide not to inquire further on a
matter, for lack of time or resources. And one can even accept hypotheses that one
takes to be false although relevant to the topic, for the sake of reasoning or for
seeing where they can lead. One could even, in cases of urgency or of danger, prefer
to hold a belief that one takes to be beneficial or comforting. And one can certainly
be blamed or praised for these actions. But is Sosa’s claim true of belief itself?
Cases were, for instance one deliberates about forming a belief about a subject
matter rather than forming no belief are indeed cases where we balance the aim of
truth against other aims (Steglich-Petersen 2009). But are these cases were the very
process of formation of the belief is subject to a balance between epistemic and
practical aims? Not at all. Inquiry is a process which has an intentional aim, truth,
and which is composed of a number of individual performances which also have an
aim, in general truth, but sometimes, not. But it does not follow from this aimed
character of inquiry that the beliefs which are formed as a result of inquiry are
themselves performances, which could be motivated rationally by reasons other than
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epistemic (Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof 2013).1 Sosa seems to recognize this,
when he reminds us that an agent who looks ‘‘disinterestedly’’ for truth can be
affected unconsciously by his desire to believe something for reasons of control, but
forbears doing so, motivated by the desire to believe correctly. He says that here the
subject does not take any positive action of forming the belief, and lets his epistemic
competence work, through a process that is not an action. If a believer, like a river
pilot, sets his belief system on the default mode, beliefs are formed through no
decisions (KFW, p. 32). I fully concur. But then here is no more aiming at truth in
the sense of a performance for first-order belief than there is aiming on the part of
the river pilot when he lets he boat follow its trajectory. So why does Sosa not
accept that the right or wrong kind of reason for belief is a matter of conceptual
necessity?
One further difficulty that Sosa’s performance account of normativity encounters
is that a number of normative judgments that we pass on beliefs are of a deontic
unrestricted general form, and not an evaluation of the skill or competence of the
agent in a particular domain. When we disagree with someone else’s belief or claim
to know, or in the way it has been formed, for instance when we say ‘‘This is false’’,
or ‘‘You ought not to believe this’’ or ‘‘You should have known’’, we do not
disagree over a particular competence or a particular performance, but with respect
to general, cross-domain, features of the belief—indeed its epistemic features. Such
judgments have typically a deontic form (Grimm 2009). So why not accept the view
which is in many ways rival to the teleological account of epistemic normativity,
namely the thesis that the correctness of a belief is due to the existence of a norm
governing belief? (Wedgwood 2002) The obvious candidate is that belief is subject
to a norm of truth: a belief is correct if and only if it is true, and one ought to believe
that p if an only if p. In taking this correctness condition as a norm for the concept of
belief rather than as a teleological principle governing the performance of the
believer, one can explain why this norm can apply to both cases were belief in not a
conscious aim of the believer and to cases were he deliberates consciously. A
conceptual or constitutive norm need not be explicitly entertained by the believer,
and it can regulate both beliefs where our use of the concept of belief is tacit (as in
self-deception) and those where it is explicit (as in deliberation about what to
believe).
The objections to such a view, however, are many. Some take the same form as
those which can be addressed to a transcendent aim of truth: the norm seems to
1 McHugh (2012) suggests counterexamples to exclusivity with cases of suspension of judgment. But his
cases are not cases of belief, but of acceptance. And they do not defeat the normative claims associated to
exclusivity. They only put pressure on the psychological fact of exclusivity. But normativists about belief
have never claimed that non evidential or non-epistemic reasons cannot occur and play a role in belief
formation as a matter of psychological fact or causally. What they object to is with the normative thesis of
non-exclusivity. Nobody denies that non evidential reasons are sometimes motivating reasons (in the
causal) sense for beliefs. Even McHugh’s claim that such cases are cases of direct belief motivated by
non-evidential considerations is dubious: these are cases where you believe that it would be good for you
to believe p, i.e. cases of attitude based reasons, not content based reasons. And McHugh’s claim that it
cannot be an acceptance is implausible. The cases he describes are indeed cases of acceptance rather than
belief!
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impose on us impossible obligations, thus violating the principle that ought implies
can (Steglich-Petersen 2006; Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007). Others have to do with
the implausibly prescriptive character of the norm, when the oughts of belief are
taken as obligations (Glu¨er and Wikforss 2009). Prescriptions, it is argued, about
what one ought to believe when the only norm is truth do not make sense of the idea
that a norm has to guide and regulate our belief formation. I can here neither deal
here with these nor suggest my preferred version of the view, which takes the norm
to be a conceptual norm and not a guiding one (Shah 2003; Engel to appear), but
these objections can be overcome. The most obvious objection, from Sosa’s point of
view, is that even if one takes epistemic normativity to consist in the sole feature of
accuracy—truth—of a belief, all the other features which contribute to our
evaluation of the correctness of the belief—the internal factors of the believing—
disappear, and we are just left with the bare external correctness of the belief
content, which is truth.2 Clearly the normative account would be deficient if it
reduced epistemic normativity to accuracy—truth. Epistemic normativity also
belongs to the evidence that the believer has to have in order to believe correctly.
This suggests that the norm of truth has also to be a norm of knowledge, as a number
of people have argued and as actually Sosa himself seems ready to argue too:
Knowledge is the norm of belief, i.e. to believe that p – to be disposed to
affirm that p - in full epistemic propriety or worth, requires knowing that
p(KFW: 49).
I fully agree (Engel 2005; Smithies 2012).
It actually seems to me that Sosa can accept a normative account of epistemic
normativity, provided he accepts a sharper distinction than the one he is prepared to
make between belief and knowledge, on the one hand, and inquiry on the other.
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